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TRANSFORMING THE CULTURE OF CHINESE PROSECUTORS 
THROUGH GUIDING CASES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In their comparative study of the rise of political liberalism in Europe and America, Halliday 
and Karpik focused on the important role of lawyers in demanding basic rights for their 
clients and subsequently mobilizing to demand broader liberalization of the political system.1 
However, after examining a broader range of regimes throughout the world that underwent 
liberalization in the late 20th century, Halliday et al found that in political systems where 
lawyers’ status was relatively weak, such as South Korea and Taiwan, the decisive impetus 
for liberalization came primarily from cooperation by other actors exerting greater influence 
within the broader “legal complex”, including judges, legal academics, civil servants, and 
prosecutors.2  
The recent persecution of activist lawyers in China and heavy-handed attempts to 
restrict the work of civil society groups demonstrates the government’s suspicion of their 
threat to the authoritarian regime, and suggests that political liberalization is still far away.3 
                                                          
1 Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik, eds, Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political 
Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.5-6. 
2 Lucien Karpik and Terence C. Halliday, “The Legal Complex”, Center on Law and 
Globalization Research Paper No. 11-05 (2011), p.5, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928156 ; and Terence C. Halliday, 
Lucien Karpik and Malcolm M. Feeley, Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Studies 
of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism (Oxford: Hart, 2007), especially chap 1 by 
Tom Ginsburg. 
3 Hualing Fu (2018) “The July 9th (709) Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers: Legal 
Advocacy in an Authoritarian State,” Journal of Contemporary China 27:112, pp.554-568; 
and Sida Liu and Terence C. Halliday, Criminal Defense in China: The Politics of Lawyers at 
Work (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Cf. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Repression 
and Resilience: Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2017), 
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Yet simultaneously, unprecedented numbers of legally-trained personnel have entered the 
senior ranks of the Chinese government, and a significant professionalization of the courts 
and procuracy has taken place.4 This generational personnel shift within China’s legal 
complex has begun to bear fruit in the form of major new legislation and regulations designed 
to protect basic due process rights and increase transparency within the court system, and in a 
renewed effort to promote rule of law practices right down to the local court level.5 
In an attempt to ensure consistency and quality in implementing these newly protected 
rights, the Supreme People’s Procuracy (SPP) has issued fifteen sets of Guiding Cases since 
December 2010, focusing on key criminal procedure and public interest issues.6  These are 
actual cases resolved by local procurators and then selected by the SPP as approved models 
for all procurators to follow. These SPP Guiding Cases reveal an aspirational change in the 
mindset or culture of China’s public prosecutors from obedient servants of repressive and 
corrupt local governments and police to professional champions of justice and the public 
interest. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pp.24-9, https://www.nchrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CHRD-2017-Annual-Report-of-
Situation-of-HRDs-in-China_Feb-2018.pdf 
4 Cheng Li, “The Rise of the Legal Profession in the Chinese Leadership”, Brookings 
Institution (June 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Read-the-
article.pdf . 
5 Colin Hawes, “How Chinese Judges Deal with Ambiguity in Corporate Law: Suggestions 
for Improving the Chinese Case Precedent System,” Australian Journal of Asian Law Vol 19 
No 1 (August 2018): 1-22; and Colin Hawes, Alex K L Lau and Angus Young, “Lifting the 
Corporate Veil in China: Statutory Vagueness, Shareholder Ignorance, and Case Precedents 
in a Civil Law System,” Journal of Corporate Law Studies vol.15.2 (2015): 341-376.     
6 See all SPP Guiding Cases in Chinese on the SPP website: SPP, Zhidaoxing anli, 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/jczdal/index.shtml . No English translations are currently 
available, so all translations in this article are by the author, who has extensive experience 
translating Chinese legal texts into English. For issue dates and topics covered by each set of 
Guiding Cases, see the Appendix. 
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The SPP’s Guiding Cases have been generally ignored by English-language 
commentators,7 in marked contrast with the Guiding Cases issued by the Supreme People’s 
Court (SPC).8 Yet the SPP Guiding Cases may have a much broader impact on the operation 
of the Chinese legal system for three reasons.  
First, several of the SPP Guiding Cases focus on procedural and evidential aspects of 
the death penalty, so if followed by all procurators, they will literally have a life or death 
impact on criminal suspects. 
Second, the SPP Guiding Cases make it clear that a key role of procurators is to uphold 
the public interest against abuse by powerful officials or corporate interests. Many of the SPP 
Guiding Cases deal with prosecution of government officials or state representatives such as 
                                                          
7 The SPP Guiding Cases are not mentioned at all on the website of the Stanford Guiding 
Cases Project: see n8 below for relevant citation. Susan Finder (2017) ‘China’s Evolving 
Case Law System in Practice’, 9 Tsinghua China Law Review 245, pp.253-4 mentions them, 
though she does not analyse their content. Trevaskes and Chen only discuss SPP Guiding 
Case 2, one of the first to be issued in 2010. See Xingliang Chen, “Guiding Cases for China’s 
Death Penalty”, in Bin Liang and Hong Lu, eds, The Death Penalty in China: Policy, 
Practice, and Reform Columbia University Press, 2015, 187-213; and Susan Trevaskes, 
“Death sentencing for stability and harmony” in Trevaskes, ed, The Politics of Law and 
Stability in China (Edward Elgar, 2014), 127-51. 
8 The director of the Stanford Guiding Cases Project has claimed that the SPC Guiding Cases 
“mark the first time that the judiciary of China, a civil law jurisdiction, has embraced 
anything similar to case law, making the [SPC Guiding Cases] system one of the most 
significant reforms for increasing the transparency of Chinese law to date.” Mei Gechlik and 
Sharon Driscoll, “Dr. Mei Gechlik on Advances in Chinese Judicial Reform: Guiding Cases,” 
Stanford Lawyer February 29, 2016, online https://law.stanford.edu/2016/02/29/dr-mei-
gechlik-on-advances-in-chinese-judicial-reform-guiding-cases/ . See also Stanford Guiding 
Cases Project at https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/. At the same time, other scholars and legal 
practitioners have questioned the utility of the SPC Guiding Cases system. They note that 
only a tiny number of SPC Guiding Cases have been issued since 2010 (to date, only 96 
cases), and most deal with relatively narrow legal issues that don’t come up very frequently. 
For some recent commentary on SPC Guiding Cases, see Mo Zhang (2017) ‘Pushing the 
Envelope: Application of Guiding Cases in Chinese Courts and Development of Case Law in 
China’, 26(2) Washington International Law Journal 269; Susan Finder (2017); Jinting Deng 
(2015), The Guiding Case System in China's Mainland, 10 Frontiers L. China 449-74; Zhu 
Mang (2017) 论指导性案例的内容构成 (On the Content and Structure of Guiding Cases), 
2017.4 中国社会科学 (Social Science in China); Zhao Lei (2018) 商事指导性案例的规范
意义 (The Normative Significance of Commercial Guiding Cases), 2018.2 Zhengfa luntan. 
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environmental protection and food safety bureaus, urban control officers and police officers, 
for corruption and criminal negligence. And the eighth set of cases focuses entirely on 
People’s Procurators bringing public interest civil and administrative lawsuits against 
environmental polluters and the government officials who fail to prevent the pollution. As 
discussed below, this pilot project has resulted in a huge increase in the number of successful 
environmental lawsuits in China. 
Finally, several SPP Guiding Cases go beyond narrow and specific points of law to 
cover broad procedural issues that are generally applicable over a wide range of criminal 
cases. For example, one of the most significant issues is the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence, especially evidence obtained through torture or beating of suspects, which is clearly 
addressed in SPP Guiding Case 27. The rule in this case can be applied to any criminal 
prosecution, and if it is followed consistently by local branches of the People’s Procuracy, it 
should reduce the number of wrongful convictions, and in the longer term, remove the 
incentive for police to mistreat criminal suspects in their custody, a frequent occurrence in 
China according to international human rights groups.9  
To be sure, these SPP Guiding Cases are only one part of a broader positive reform 
effort in the sphere of criminal procedure and regulation of procurators, including a 
comprehensive revision of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law in 2012, regulations issued by 
the SPP in relation to public interest lawsuits in 2016, and an amended PRC Procurators Law 
in 2017.10 There is also some ambiguity about the legal status and weight of SPP Guiding 
                                                          
9 Human Rights Watch, “Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police Torture of Criminal Suspects 
in China” 13 May 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/13/tiger-chairs-and-cell-
bosses/police-torture-criminal-suspects-china ; Human Rights in China, “Police Brutality,” 
https://www.hrichina.org/en/topic/police-brutality ;  
10 Jianfu Chen, Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law in The People’s Republic of 
China: Commentary and Legislation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), chap 3. 
For SPP regulations on public interest lawsuits, see discussion of environmental Guiding 
Cases below. For the Chinese text of the PRC Procurators Law, see 中华人民共和国检察官
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Cases in relation to these more formal legal sources, an issue discussed further in the 
concluding sections of this article. 
Even so, the SPP Guiding Cases clearly demonstrate to people’s procurators throughout 
China how the revised laws and regulations should be applied in practice; they provide local 
procurators with precedents endorsed at the highest levels of the SPP to support battles 
against local power interests engaged in criminal activity and environmental pollution. And 
perhaps most importantly, both the content of the Guiding Cases and the fact that they were 
issued at all reveals an unprecedented cultural change within the people’s procuracy itself 
from a body that was essentially an extension of the police or local power interests to one that 
sees itself as a professional and relatively independent institution with a focus on protecting 
individual rights and the public interest.  
As we noted, criminal defence lawyers and civil society groups are still severely 
restricted in China. This means that any positive cultural shift within the procuracy becomes 
even more significant, as it may partly compensate for the function these other groups should 
play in protecting criminal suspects’ rights and upholding the public interest. Nevertheless, 
Halliday and Karpin also provide examples where sustained efforts to improve protection of 
legal rights failed due to pushback from authoritarian or military leaderships, Egypt being a 
typical recent case study.11 Due to the continued influence of Communist Party interference 
in the Chinese legal system, demonstrated in our analysis below, it is too early to say whether 
the greater respect for basic legal rights revealed by these Guiding Cases is a step towards 
increased liberalization of the legal complex and political system.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
法 amended 1 September 2017, at 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/fl/201802/t20180201_363877.shtml   
11 Halliday and Karpin (2011), 12; Sahar F. Aziz, “Independence Without Accountability: 




The next section briefly introduces the institution of the People’s Procuracy, including 
major criticisms of its behaviour prior to the introduction of the first set of SPP Guiding 
Cases in 2010 and the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law amendments. The section also provides 
the official rationale for the Guiding Cases, and briefly explains their legal status.   
The article then analyses the unprecedented attention paid in the SPP Guiding Cases to 
legal rights and the public interest, focusing on four themes: exclusion of tainted evidence; 
death penalty cases; criminal negligence/corruption of government representatives; and 
environmental public interest lawsuits. The section on public interest suits demonstrates that 
the Guiding Cases have a significant transforming or educative function – each set of cases is 
supposed to act not just as a precedent for procurators but as an educational tool to change the 
behaviour of local government officials and agents throughout China. The article concludes 
by identifying gaps that remain to be filled by deeper institutional reforms to ensure that 
people’s procurators can truly accomplish their duty to fight injustice and protect the rights of 
all criminal suspects. 
 
BASIC FUNCTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S PROCURACY AND CRITIQUES OF ITS 
EFFECTIVENESS: GUIDING CASES AS ONE SOLUTION 
The functions of the people’s procurators in China include initiating criminal prosecutions in 
the courts; reviewing cases investigated by the public security organs (the police) and 
determining whether to approve arrest and prosecution of suspects or to exempt them from 
prosecution; supervising the legality of investigations by police; supervising the judgments of 
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courts with the power to seek review of cases – effectively an extra level of appeal; and 
supervising the legality of activities of prisons and other detention centres.12 
In carrying out their functions, procurators are supposed to “protect citizens’ right to 
lodge complaints against State functionaries who break the law and investigate the legal 
responsibility of those persons who infringe upon other citizens’ personal, democratic and 
other rights.”13 They should exercise their authority “independently, in accordance with the 
provisions of law, and shall not be subject to interference by any administrative organ, public 
organization or individual.”14 Finally, in their investigative work, they should “lay stress on 
evidence rather than readily giving credence to oral statements, and strictly forbid the 
obtaining of confessions by compulsion.”15 
In practice, Chinese procurators have often fallen short of these admirable ideals. 
Rather than supervising and carefully reviewing the investigative work of public security 
organs (the police), procurators have tended to accept their recommendations even when the 
evidence has many flaws. This was due to a prevailing mindset among procurators that they 
should cooperate closely with the police to “smash” crime and deter criminals.16 Disturbingly, 
this has led procurators to turn a blind eye to obvious torture or mistreatment of suspects in 
police custody, and contrary to their legal duties, to rely heavily on oral confessions extracted 
                                                          
12 Summarizing article 5 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates of the PRC 
amended 2 December 1986 http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/fl/201802/t20180205_364637.shtml 
(hereafter “PP Organic Law”). For procurator supervision of detention centres, see Xifen Lin 
and Wei Shen, “Reforms to China's pretrial detention system: the role of the procuratorate,” 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 44 (2016) 183-211. 
13 PP Organic Law, art 6. 
14 PP Organic Law, art 9. 
15 PP Organic Law, art 7. 
16 Peerenboom, p.312-3. Jiahong He, “Case Study on the Causes of Wrongful Conviction in 
Chinese Criminal Proceedings,” 10 Frontiers L. China 670 (2015), 671-3. 
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from suspects despite gaps and inconsistencies with other material and witness evidence.17 It 
is difficult to calculate how many wrongful convictions resulted from this shoddy 
procuratorial work, as errors generally only came to light after another person subsequently 
admitted committing the crime, or in some cases, the “murdered” victims reappeared alive 
after several years living elsewhere.18 But Chinese officials have admitted that torture in 
detention was “common, serious, and nationwide,”19 and most wrongful conviction cases 
have involved obvious collusion by procurators in covering up evidential inconsistencies and 
mistreatment of both defendants and witnesses.20 
Besides neglecting their duty to supervise public security organs, local procurators have 
also been too open to influence by local government leaders. During regular “strike hard” 
campaigns against crime from the 1980s to early 2000s, this has led them to prosecute 
suspects indiscriminately (in collaboration with police and courts), without regard to 
proportionate sentencing principles, in order to meet arbitrary quotas for criminal 
convictions.21 They have also allowed local corrupt officials and their families to escape 
punishment by abusing their power to “exempt” suspects from prosecution.22 
Finally, procurators have frequently ignored the increasingly stringent rules in 
successive amendments to the PRC Criminal Procedure law designed to protect the rights of 
suspects. For example, numerous defence lawyers have complained that procurators refused 
to allow them to meet with their detained clients or to provide them with the evidence against 
                                                          
17 See H. E. Jiahong; H. E. Ran, “Empirical Studies of Wrongful Convictions in Mainland 
China,” 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1277 (2012); and Huang Shiyuan, “Chinese Wrongful 
Convictions: Causes and Prevention,” 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1219 (2012). 
18 Huang (2012), p.1220-2. 
19 Human Rights Watch (2015): this report does not include page numbers, but see section 
entitled “Police Abuse in Pre-trial Detention.” 
20 Human Rights Watch (2015): section entitled “The Exclusionary Rule.” 
21 Susan Trevaskes, Courts and Criminal Justice in Contemporary China (Lexington, UK: 
2007), especially pp.125-7, 178. 
22 Jianfu Chen, p.75 
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those clients in timely fashion before the trial. In some cases, procurators have even arrested 
defence lawyers and had them jailed on trumped up charges merely for attempting to defend 
their clients.23  Likewise, despite the promulgation of clear rules in 2010 requiring the 
exclusion of confessions and witness statements obtained through coercion, in the period 
2010-2011, there were no recorded cases where such confessions were excluded, despite 
credible claims of torture by many suspects.24 
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) has been involved in some of the 
improvements to criminal procedure rules – the 2010 evidence exclusion rules were jointly 
issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the SPP, for example. However, until recently, the 
SPP has tended to focus more on watering down such amendments rather than changing the 
mindset and behaviour of local procurators.25 
Despite this checkered history, there are several recent factors that have caused the SPP 
to adopt a new attitude towards procedural justice, and have increased its determination to 
improve the competence and reputation of local procurators. Most notably, from the mid-
2000s onwards, a great deal of media publicity was given to numerous wrongful conviction 
cases, which publicly and embarrassingly exposed the shoddy investigative practices and 
roughshod behaviour of police and procurators.26 Responding to public outrage, both the 
Legal Affairs Office of the Communist Party’s Central Committee and the Supreme People’s 
Court successively released rules and detailed directives on preventing wrongful convictions 
in 2013, which clearly put pressure on the SPP to follow suit.27  
                                                          
23 Chen, 80-4; Liu and Halliday, Criminal Defense in China: The Politics of Lawyers at Work 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), chap 3. 
24 Daum (2011), p.700. 
25 Peerenboom, p.313; Jianfu Chen, p.61-2 
26 He Jiahong (2012), pp.1285-8; Huang Shiyuan (2012), p.1224. 
27 He Jiahong (2015), p.689, and for an English translation of the SPC’s “Directive on 
Establishing and Improving Working Mechanisms for Preventing Wrongful Convictions” 
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Secondly, the appointment of Cao Jianming, the first legally-trained Procurator-General 
of the SPP, in 2008 was a sign that the SPP was seeking to build a professional legal 
institution rather than merely behaving like an offshoot of the Ministry of Public Security. 
Previous Procurator-Generals had all been drawn from Public Security or other Communist 
Party positions with no legal qualifications.28 Zhang Jun, the current Procurator-General 
since March 2018, also has a legal background, with three law degrees and decades of 
experience as a judge and criminal law specialist in the Supreme People’s Court.29  
Thirdly, the SPC’s move toward greater transparency of trials and online publication of 
court judgments, especially since 2013, means that decisions about admission of evidence 
and the quality of procurators’ arguments can no longer be hidden from public view, and their 
legal errors will be much more obvious.30 Finally, all procurators hired since 2001 are 
required to obtain a formal legal qualification and pass the national law exam, and most of 
the older generation of procurators who lacked any legal training will have retired by now, 
leading to a generational shift toward greater understanding of rule of law.  
This greater focus on formal legal education was part of the Chinese government’s 
broader reforms to improve the professional quality of all legal practitioners, including 
lawyers, judges and procurators. Prior to 2001, many practitioners, even among senior high 
court judges, were simply transferred into their positions from other government jobs or the 
military, without any formal legal training, due to a shortage of qualified law students and a 
lingering Communist Party suspicion of independent professionals. The introduction of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(issued 9 October 2013), see Na Jiang, Wrongful Convictions in China (Springer 2016), 305-
8, available at https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm%3A978-3-662-46084-9%2F1.pdf . 
28 See Colin Hawes, “Improving the Quality of the Judiciary in China: Recent Reforms to the 
Procedures for Appointing, Promoting & Discharging Judges,” in K.E. Malleson & Peter H. 
Russell, eds., Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from 
Around the World (University of Toronto Press, 2006): 395-419, p.401. 
29 See Zhang Jun, SPP website, http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/gjyld/zhangjun/index.shtml  
30 Hawes, “How Chinese Judges,” pp.6-7. 
11 
 
national law exam for lawyers, judges and procurators in 2001, along with stricter legal 
knowledge requirements for all law practitioners, has gradually led to improvements in the 
quality of legal personnel, including within the procuracy.31  
Thus, while the SPP initially appeared to be simply jumping on the same bandwagon as 
the Supreme People’s Court by issuing its own Guiding Cases, surprisingly it has used these 
Cases to vigorously promote unprecedented respect for criminal suspects’ procedural rights, 
and to demand that procurators act independently and hold local public security organs and 
government officials strictly to account on behalf of the public interest.     
The SPP first issued a “Regulation on Case Guidance Work” in 2010 (amended in 
2015), and several other commentaries have appeared on the SPP’s website explaining the 
intended role of SPP Guiding Cases.32 According to the Regulation, the aim of Guiding Cases 
is to “promote strict fairness in procurators’ judicial work and to ensure consistency and 
correct application of the law” (Art 1). The Guiding Cases must also have a “positive legal 
and social impact” and “guiding relevance for managing similar cases in the areas of 
establishing the facts, ensuring reliability of evidence, application of statutes, or correct 
                                                          
31 中华人民共和国检察官法 (PRC Procurators Law issued 2001; amended 2017), articles 
10(6) and 13; and Hawes, “Improving the Quality,” p.397. 
32 最高人民检察院关于案例指导工作的规定 (SPP Regulation on Case Guidance Work), 
amended 9 December 2015, at 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/201601/t20160119_111257.shtml ; Liu Shujuan, 规范案例指导
工作：发挥指导性作用 规范司法办案 (Regularize case guidance work: let guidance reach 
its potential to regularize judicial case management), SPP Website, 1 February 2017, 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/201702/t20170215_181152.shtml ; Peng Bo, 最高检明确：指
导性案例不得作为直接法律依据 (SPP clarifies that Guiding Cases should not be used as a 
formal source of law), People’s Daily, 19 January 2016, 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/201601/t20160119_111271.shtml ; Li Yueping, 强化程序法指
导性案例作用 (Strengthening the role of guiding cases in procedural law), Procuratorial 
Daily, 9 February 2016, http://www.spp.gov.cn/llyj/201609/t20160902_165546.shtml ; Liu 
Jinlin, 重视发挥指导性案例法治引领功能 (Another look at how Guiding Cases can help to 




understanding of policies” (Art 2). In terms of applying the Guiding Cases, Art 3 states that 
“When referring to Guiding Cases in their case management work, People’s Procurators may 
quote the relevant Guiding Case as a means of clarifying the law or giving reasons for their 
decision, but they must not use them to replace statutes or judicial interpretations as the direct 
legal basis for their disposition of cases” (Art 3).  
Apart from these very general statements, the Regulation is silent on the legal force of 
the Guiding Cases or the consequences of procurators failing to follow them. Other 
commentaries by SPP officials have slightly clarified the intended function of the Guiding 
Cases, but there is still no definitive statement on what will happen if procurators ignore them. 
For example, a director of the SPP’s Policy Research Office stated: “Although the Guiding 
Cases do not have the binding application force of statutes or judicial interpretations, they 
possess a relatively strong guiding relevance for all procurators when managing similar 
cases.”33  
At the same time, the SPP certainly expects all procurators to use the Guiding Cases as 
a tool for correctly applying statutes and other binding regulations. The SPP’s announcement 
on the issuance of the second set of Guiding Cases in November 2012 declared: 
“Implementing this case guidance system can save judicial resources and improve the 
efficiency of judicial practice; and it can overcome the problem of similar cases being 
decided inconsistently, thereby bringing about judicial fairness.”34 Likewise, the director of 
the SPP’s Law and Policy Research Office clarified the requirement that procurators “refer to” 
the Guiding Cases: “This means that generally speaking [procurators] must follow them. If 
                                                          
33 Peng Bo (2016). 
34 Xu Ridan, 高检院公布第二批指导性案例 (The SPP publishes the second set of Guiding 




they don’t follow them, they need to give an explanation and obtain the approval of their 
local director or procuratorial committee.”35 
  
The rest of this article provides several examples of the above-noted attitudinal shift 
within the Chinese procuracy by analysing the content of Guiding Cases in the four main 
categories, and placing them within the context of recent broader reforms to the procuracy 
and legal system. We begin with one of the most significant issues: the exclusion of 
confessions and other evidence obtained through coercion.    
 
POLICE BRUTALITY AND EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Guiding Case 27 involves a suspect named Wang Yulei from Shunping County in Hebei 
Province.36 The facts are briefly summarized as follows:  
Around 10pm on 18 February 2014, the Shunping County public security office 
received a call from Wang Yulei stating that he was currently on his way home and had come 
across the dead body of a male person lying on the ground with bloodstains beside him. The 
next day, the Shunping County public security began a formal investigation of the case which 
resulted in them concluding that Wang Yulei was the main suspect. On 3 March 2014, they 
detained Wang Yulei in custody on suspicion of murder. Following their interrogation, on 15 
March 2014 the public security office made a request to the People’s Procuracy that Wang be 
formally arrested and charged with the crime.  
                                                          
35 Jiang Anjie, 最高人民检察院研究室主任陈国庆: 检察机关案例指导制度的构建 (Chen 
Guoqing, Director of the SPP’s Research Office, on the establishment of the SPP’s case 
guidance system), Fazhi ribao 5 January 2010,  
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxy/content/2011-01/05/content_2427651.htm?node=21211  
36 The numbers of the Guiding Cases are provided by the SPP on issuance of the cases. SPP 
website, http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/jczdal/index.shtml .  
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The Guiding Case then takes a surprising turn. The Shunping County people’s 
procurator noticed that there were several doubtful points and contradictions in the evidence. 
Apart from Wang Yulei’s confession, there was no other evidence linking him to the crime. 
He had been interrogated nine times, and did not admit guilt until the sixth interrogation. 
Even then, he wasn’t able to give an account that was consistent with the victim’s injuries, 
and no murder weapon was found. Some other key material evidence was not collected, such 
as DNA from a glove found at the scene, and the autopsy failed to state the probable time of 
the victim’s death. There was also no clear motive for Wang to kill the victim.  
Besides these serious evidential gaps, when the procurator interviewed Wang for the 
first time, he noticed that his right arm was bandaged and apparently injured, and Wang was 
extremely evasive about how this had happened. The procurator reported this to his superiors, 
and they set up a video-taped interview with Wang where they promised to protect him, and 
he finally admitted that the police had mistreated him, and his confession was false. The 
procurator concluded that this confession was obtained illegally, so it should be excluded. As 
there was no other evidence linking Wang to the crime, the procurator rejected the public 
security office’s request to formally arrest and charge Wang, and he was released from 
custody. The Guiding Case then makes it clear that following this decision, the Shunping 
County people’s procuracy supervised the further police investigation, and four months later, 




Referring to Articles 54, 79, 86 and 88 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the 
Guiding Case concludes with some “key points” that all procurators should take from this 
case:37 
When reviewing arrest cases, procurators must strictly uphold the principle of 
legality of evidence. They must be adept at spotting illegally obtained evidence and 
must resolutely exclude such evidence from consideration. Once illegally obtained 
evidence has been excluded, if the remaining evidence cannot prove that the 
suspect has committed the crime, permission should not be granted to formally 
arrest and charge the suspect. … Evidence must be obtained through legal means, 
and this does not include torture, violence or other illegal methods … Procurators 
must always carefully review any complaints, tips or other indications by the 
suspect, their lawyer, witnesses or victims that torture, violence or other illegal 
evidence collection methods have been used. 
As noted earlier, the idea that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded is not 
unique to this Guiding Case. Article 54 of the Criminal Procedure Law was introduced in 
2012, and this codified and expanded the evidence exclusion rules jointly issued by the SPC, 
SPP and Public Security in 2010.38 But as Jeremy Daum noted, the 2010 rules did not seem 
                                                          
37 Guiding Case 27, “Key Points”. For a full English translation of the 2012 amended PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law, which was current when this Guiding Case was issued, see 
Congressional Executive Commission on China, Criminal Procedure Law of the People's 
Republic of China, amended 14 March 2012, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-
provisions/criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china . Some minor 
amendments to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law were made in 2018, which affected the 
numbering of the provisions cited above, which are currently Arts. 56, 81, 88 and 90:  For the 
2018 amended Law, see China Law Translate, Criminal Procedure Law (2018), 
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/criminal-procedure-law-2018/ [accessed 19 January 
2020]. 
38 PRC Criminal Procedure Law (2012), arts 53-8: see previous footnote for full citation to 
English translation of this Law. Cf. Jianfu Chen (2013), 84-5; and Jeremy Daum, “Tortuous 
Progress: Early Cases under China's New Procedures for Excluding Evidence in Criminal 
Cases,” 43 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 699 (2011).  
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to change the practice of evidence obtained through torture and other illegal means being 
used in court.39 Jianfu Chen, writing in 2013, acknowledged that the 2012 Criminal 
Procedure Law filled important gaps in the earlier evidence exclusion provisions, yet he also 
expressed scepticism about whether they would actually change procurator behaviour.40  
Surveys conducted during the three years after 2012 seem to bear out this scepticism. A 
study by Zhang Jian of 486 court judgments decided between 2013 and 2015 where 
defendants had raised the issue of illegally obtained evidence found that the court approved 
further investigation of the evidence in only 53 cases. Of these, only 8 cases resulted in illegal 
evidence being excluded, and the accused was found innocent in only 1 case.41 The main 
reason courts provided for refusing to investigate the evidence (in 324 out of 486 cases) was 
that the procurator had given an “explanation” that had satisfied the court, but as Zhang notes, 
this falls far short of a thorough evaluation of the allegedly illegal evidence.42  
Another study by Wu Hongqi found that procurators were so concerned about 
maintaining their high conviction rates that they sometimes used alternative methods to 
introduce evidence that should have been excluded. For example, they would exclude a 
suspect’s confession that was obviously obtained using torture, but would introduce a second 
                                                          
39 Daum (2011), p.700.   
40 Chen (2013), p.85-6. 
41 Zhang Jian, 审判中心改革背景下非法证据排除规则的落实与完善 (The implementation 
and improvement of illegal evidence exclusion rules in the context of reforms to put trials at 
the centre of adjudication), Xi’an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao 26.3 (May 2016), 40 at 41. 
42 Zhang (2016), 42. See similar findings in a survey of 557 Chinese criminal defence 
lawyers: Lin Xifen and Dong Kun, 非法证据排除规则运行状况的实证研究: 以５５７份
律师调查问卷为样本 (Empirical research on the application of illegal evidence exclusion 
rules based on a sample of 557 responses from a lawyer questionnaire survey), Jiaoda faxue 
2016.3, p.125.   
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confession obtained from the same suspect at a later stage (when the suspect had presumably 
resigned himself to his fate, and no longer needed to be beaten to confess to a crime).43  
At the same time, Wu noted a significant increase in the number of cases where 
procurators had voluntarily excluded key evidence since the 2010 regulatory rules were 
introduced.44 But they did this prior to any formal trial proceedings to avoid the risk of a 
mistrial or acquittal. In this way, procurators could maintain high conviction rates for cases 
that they actually took to court. Wu concludes that even though the evidence exclusion rules 
have not led to higher rates of acquittal by courts, they have forced procurators to ensure that 
cases they do bring to the court are supported by more reliable material evidence rather than 
confessions obtained through police duress.45  
By circulating Guiding Case 27 on this topic in 2016, the SPP demonstrated its strong 
support for a stricter reading of the evidence exclusion rules in the Criminal Procedure Law. 
It provided a concrete illustration to all procurators how these rules should be applied in 
practice to exclude tainted evidence, using the vivid story of the innocent Wang Yulei.  It also 
explained why they are so important: exclusion of such evidence will not merely prevent 
innocent people being convicted, but even more important, it will focus the attention of the 
police on collecting real material evidence rather than relying on forced confessions, and 
thereby reduce the likelihood of the actual criminals escaping punishment and causing more 
danger to society. To emphasize the importance of this point, the Guiding Case stated that 
after Wang Yulei was acquitted, the procuracy and police worked together to reinvestigate 
                                                          
43 Wu Hongqi, 证据排除抑或证据把关: 审查起诉阶段非法证据排除的实证研究 
(Evidence exclusion or evidential threshold? Empirical research on the exclusion of evidence 
at the investigatory stage of lawsuits), Fazhi yu Shehui Fazhan 2016.5, 149 at 154-8. 
44 Wu (2016), p.153. 
45 Wu (2016), p.164. 
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and re-examine the evidence, leading to the arrest and conviction of a different suspect, Wang 
Bin, for the murder.46 
The other interesting point that emerges from this case is that the decision on excluding 
evidence was made by the procurator before any formal charges were laid. The suspect was 
released immediately, removing him from the dangers of police custody and possible further 
coercion. In this way, the SPP made it clear that procurators must play a pro-active role in 
“balancing the need to punish crime with the requirement to protect human rights.”47 This 
practice is consistent with Wu’s finding that more procurators are voluntarily excluding 
tainted evidence before making decisions about bringing cases to court. 
Of course, Guiding Cases are not the only method used by the SPP to modify the 
behaviour of procurators. For example, in June 2017, the SPP co-issued with the SPC and 
Ministry of Public Security a new set of detailed regulations on exclusion of evidence that 
plugged some of the loopholes used by police and procurators, such as introducing a second 
confession from the same suspect after the first confession has been excluded due to duress, 
or playing carefully edited videos of interrogations rather than providing the full unedited 
videos to the court and defendant.48 But what the Guiding Cases have done is clearly 
demonstrate to procurators how to apply these rules to real fact situations, and why the rules 
are important in ensuring that the correct offender is punished.  
                                                          
46 See Guiding Case 27, “Result of the Case”. 
47 Guiding Case 27, “Guiding Significance”. 
48 See SPC, SPP, MPS, MSS and MoJ, 关于办理刑事案件严格排除非法证据若干问题的
规定 (Regulation on several issues relating to strictly excluding illegal evidence when 




Throughout the Guiding Cases, there is a similar emphasis on ensuring that attempts to 
punish crime do not lead to injustice and wrongful conviction.49 It contrasts with the earlier 
history of the SPP, where cracking down on crime was the overwhelming priority, and human 
or procedural rights were generally given short shrift. This change of emphasis is particularly 
clear in two suspended death penalty Guiding Cases.   
 
DEATH PENALTY REVERSALS: OVERTURNING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Guiding Cases 25 and 26 both deal with death penalties suspended for two years. Convicted 
offenders are incarcerated, but if they do not commit further crimes after two years, their 
suspended death penalties will normally be commuted to life imprisonment.50 Both these 
Guiding Cases went through appeals and re-trials, without resulting in a challenge to the 
original guilty verdicts. It was only when the offenders applied to the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy for review that the evidence in both cases was found insufficient, and both 
offenders were finally acquitted. In Guiding Case 25, the applicant had already been in jail 
for 15 years, and in Case 26, for 22 years. The reason for this long delay is not clear from the 
Guiding Cases, but it is likely that the Supreme People’s Procuracy did not start to address 
the problem of overturning wrongful convictions until relatively recently, after it was 
announced as a key policy priority by the Communist Party’s Central Committee and the SPC 
in 2013.  
                                                          
49 The tenth set of Guiding Cases makes it clear that exclusion of tainted evidence should not 
be limited to offences involving the death penalty or life imprisonment: Guiding Case 39 
involved a fraudulent investment scheme where several witnesses claimed they had been 
cheated by the defendant. Some witness statements were excluded by the procurator because 
they had not been signed by the witnesses, and so their authenticity was doubtful. 
50 See PRC Criminal Law (amended 2015), arts 48-51. For suspended death penalties, see 
Xingliang Chen (2015), 191-5; and Trevaskes (2014), 131-4.  
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The two Guiding Cases are similar in many ways, and their publication together is 
clearly intended to warn procurators not to rely on suspects’ confessions as their main proof 
of guilt. As the “Key Points” section of Guiding Case 26 puts it: “If there is only a confession 
and no other objective evidence, or there are contradictions and inconsistencies between a 
confession and other objective evidence, and this leads to a reasonable doubt about the facts, 
one should follow the principle that doubt establishes innocence, and the accused should be 
acquitted.”51 
Likewise, in these two cases, as in Guiding Case 27, there is a recognition that abuse of 
power by the police commonly leads to false confessions, and less weight should be given to 
confessions when procurators decide whether to go ahead with charging the suspect. Guiding 
Case 25 concludes:52 
Resolutely guarding against wrongful and unjust convictions is crucial for 
maintaining a fair and just society. The procuracy must uphold the law by correcting 
errors in criminal judgments that have already been made, and also take more care to 
exercise proper supervision and restraints when reviewing requests for formal arrest 
and prosecution … [especially] if the suspect has made several different confessions 
and there are contradictions among these confessions, or there are major unresolved 
contradictions between key points in the confession and other evidence in the case, so 
that another person could have committed the crime. 
 
What is interesting about these two Guiding Cases is that neither conclusively proved 
that the accused were innocent. Rather they found that there were inconsistencies between the 
accused’s confessions and the material evidence, and the latter raised reasonable doubt as to 
                                                          
51 Guiding Case 26 “Guiding Significance”. 
52 Guiding Case 25, “Key Points”. 
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whether the accused committed the crime; but in the previous trials and appeals where the 
defendants were found guilty, this material evidence was not given much weight compared to 
the confessions. This was typical of both court and procurator attitudes to confessions in the 
past, as noted earlier.  
Here, however, the accused in both cases are acquitted. In Guiding Case 25, Yu 
Yingsheng was accused of murdering his wife at home after an argument about money, 
smothering her with a pillow and then covering up the crime by making it look like an 
intruder had robbed their home and raped and killed his wife while he was out. He confessed 
to the crime while in police custody, but after his conviction he retracted the confession and 
sought to appeal. While the evidence did show that Yu had argued with his wife, there were 
various inconsistencies between Yu’s confession and the material evidence. For example, in 
his confession Yu claimed that he had re-arranged his wife’s clothing to make it look like she 
had been raped, whereas DNA evidence showed that there was actually another person’s 
semen on his wife’s body and her underclothes at the scene of the crime. Other key evidence 
was either lost by police or not presented to the prosecution, such as a set of another person’s 
finger-prints from the crime scene that was collected by the police, but inexplicably was not 
forwarded to the original procurator. Likewise, the records of Yu’s pager and work telephone, 
which could have proven his claim that he was at work during the time when the crime was 
committed, were collected from the phone company but then lost by the police or procurator 
without explanation.  
The inconsistencies in Yu’s confession, the material evidence suggesting that another 
person was at the crime scene, and the loss of some crucial evidence by the police together 
raised sufficient doubt about Yu’s guilt. He was belatedly acquitted and released in 2013. 
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In Guiding Case 26, Chen Man, a migrant worker in Hainan Province, was found guilty 
of killing his former landlord with a kitchen chopper and then trying to cover up the murder 
by setting fire to the landlord’s apartment. There was evidence that Chen had a dispute with 
the landlord over unpaid rent, and the landlord had evicted him a few days earlier. Chen 
confessed after being held in police custody.  
When the case was finally re-examined, there were several inconsistencies between 
Chen’s confession and the other evidence in the case. For example, three witnesses had 
testified that they were with Chen in another building at the time when the murder took place 
(the time of the murder had been confirmed by a neighbour who heard screams from the 
landlord’s apartment). This alibi evidence was ignored in the trials and appeals of the case. 
Likewise, in his confession Chen claimed that he had thrown the murder weapon on the 
ground, but it was actually found carefully placed on a chopping board in the kitchen having 
been wiped clean of any blood. And a bloody shirt that was allegedly found by the police at 
the crime scene was carelessly lost before it could be tested. These inconsistencies and loss of 
key material evidence together raised a reasonable doubt about Chen’s guilt and his 
conviction was finally overturned. 
The SPP’s commentary on these two cases, quoted above, makes it clear that 
overturning wrongful convictions is extremely important, but equally crucial is to prevent 
such convictions from happening in the first place. The SPP does not spare its own local 
procurators here either, as it is evident from the litigation history presented in these cases that 
the original people’s procurators failed to challenge the evidentiary discrepancies and brought 
charges against the accused based on confessions that were riddled with inconsistencies. It is 
clear from their content that these Guiding Cases have an educational function, attempting to 
demonstrate to procurators the dangers of relying on dubious confessions rather than putting 




From these cases, one cannot conclude that the SPP is going soft on crime. Indeed, 
there are two other Guiding Cases where the procurators are praised for challenging court 
verdicts that were too lenient. For example, Guiding Case 2 praises the Zhejiang Provincial 
People’s Procuracy for successfully challenging a suspended death sentence handed down by 
the Zhejiang High Court for being too lenient, which ultimately resulted in increasing the 
penalty to an immediate death sentence. The case involved the pre-meditated kidnapping and 
subsequent murder of a 9-year old girl. 
Guiding Case 18 approves a similar result where the Mianyang Municipal People’s 
Court in Sichuan had originally handed down a suspended death sentence. The accused had 
committed several violent offences during a night club brawl, including killing a customer at 
the club, and he was a repeat offender with prior convictions. At the re-trial, the procurator 
successfully argued that while none of the current offences committed separately would have 
led to an immediate death penalty, in combination they were sufficiently heinous to make a 
suspended death penalty too lenient. Guiding Case 18 concludes by setting out some general 
principles for death penalty cases:53   
 
According to law, it is only appropriate to use the death penalty for criminal elements 
who commit extremely serious offences. The death penalty should be given for the 
most serious offences that involve murder, intentional assault, kidnapping or bombing 
in connection with organized crime, terrorism or violent gangs. If the people’s courts 
do not give the [immediate] death penalty in such cases, the people’s procuracy 
should challenge the verdict based on the law. 
                                                          




Both Xingliang Chen and Susan Trevaskes have separately discussed the SPP Guiding 
Cases in connection with the death penalty, but only the first set of cases had been issued 
when they wrote their respective chapters, and Guiding Case 2 is the only death penalty case 
in that set.54 Not surprisingly, neither Chen and Trevaskes considered the SPP Guiding Cases 
to be dramatically different from the practices applied by courts and procurators previously.  
Chen noted that Guiding Case 2 and earlier SPC cases on the use of suspended death 
penalties “are expected to standardize the imposition of the death penalty,” and because it is 
easy to compare the facts to other similar cases, they “are expected to have a positive impact 
on China’s death penalty practice.”55 However, various factors, such as the political need to 
maintain social stability, public support for the death penalty, and pressure from victims, 
mean that “the restraining effect of guiding cases on imposition of the death penalty could 
remain rather limited.”56 Likewise, Trevaskes, noted that “senior justice authorities in the 
SPC and SPP have attempted to standardize discretionary decision-making in homicide 
cases.”57  
However, these commentaries by Chen and Trevaskes were both published before the 
SPP’s Guiding Cases 25-27 were issued in 2016. As noted above, these more recent Guiding 
Cases go way beyond technical distinctions between immediate and suspended death 
penalties. In all of the previous death penalty SPC and SPP Guiding Cases, the defendants 
were still found guilty and sentenced to at least life imprisonment. By contrast, in Guiding 
Cases 25-27, the SPP has issued three strong examples where defendants were totally 
acquitted after wrongful suspended death penalty convictions, or charges were completely 
                                                          
54 Xingliang Chen (2015); Trevaskes (2014).  
55 Xingliang Chen (2015) p.211. 
56 Xingliang Chen (2015) p.212. 
57 Trevaskes (2014), p.149 
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dropped before trial due to tainted confessions. They display a clear change of emphasis from 
the earlier cases where punishing crime rather than protecting the basic legal rights of 
suspects was still the main focus. If the “key points” in these cases are followed properly by 
all local procurators, as the SPP clearly intends they should be, it could lead to a more activist 
people’s procuracy that stands up against police brutality and shoddy evidence collection, and 
refuses to accept dubious confessions at face value due to the risk of wrongful convictions.  
 
OFFICIAL CORRUPTION AND CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 
One of the major problems that has led to public distrust in the Chinese political and justice 
systems during the reform period is official corruption.58 Not surprisingly, therefore, another 
major preoccupation of the SPP Guiding Cases is criminal negligence by government 
officials, which often results from bribery and corruption.  
Since 1997, Chapter 9 of the PRC Criminal Law has included various offences of 
“dereliction of duty.”59 Most of these provisions require the offender to be a “state 
functionary,” a term that has been defined very broadly in a 2002 interpretation by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress:60   
                                                          
58 For some useful surveys of corruption in China, see Melanie Manion, Corruption by 
Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Harvard University 
Press, 2004); Minxin Pei, China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay 
(Harvard University Press, 2016); and Hualing Fu, “China’s Striking Anticorruption 
Adventure: A Political Journey toward the Rule of Law?” in Weitseng Chen, ed, The Beijing 
Consensus? How China Has Changed the Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), 249-74. 
59 Chapter 8 of the 1979 PRC Criminal Law included only 8 articles on dereliction of duty 
compared to 23 in the 1997 amendment. 
60 NPC Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于《中华人民共和国刑法》
第九章渎职罪主体适用问题的解释 (Interpretation on the problem of identifying the 
offender in the PRC Criminal Law, chapter 9, offence of dereliction of duty), 28 December 




Staff carrying out public duties in organizations that have been given state 
administrative management authority under laws or regulations, or staff carrying out 
public duties in organizations that have been granted delegated authority as 
representatives of government institutions, or staff who are working for a government 
institution even though they are not listed as government employees, when they fail to 
do their duty while carrying out their delegated tasks and they breach one of the 
relevant criminal offence provisions, should be prosecuted under [chapter 9] offences 
of dereliction of duty.  
 
Despite this broad definition issued in 2002, local procurators apparently still had 
difficulty applying the dereliction of duty offences. Many of these offences involved a 
combination of negligence and corruption by local government officials or agents, and so the 
failure to prosecute such cases may have been due to external political pressure on 
procurators rather than ambiguity in the Criminal Law.61  
To underscore the urgency of prosecuting such offences, the SPP published five 
Guiding Cases (4-8) on various kinds of dereliction of duty in 2012, and another five (12-16) 
specifically dealing with corruption and dereliction of duty in the area of food safety in 2014. 
These Guiding Cases cover a range of different personnel, including staff working for state-
owned enterprises, staff of village or urban residents’ committees, contractors hired to assist 
city management officers in keeping unlicensed vendors off the streets, fair trade office staff 
                                                          
61 Keith Hand, “Watching the Watchdog: China's State Compensation Law as a Remedy for 
Procuratorial Misconduct, 9 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 95 (2000) at 98-103. 
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protecting consumers from fraud, local public security officers, and food safety and 
environmental protection agencies.    
A key point that is constantly reinforced through these cases is that when the state’s 
delegated officers or agents fail to carry out their duties, it will frequently lead to serious 
social disorder and danger to ordinary citizens. The people’s procurators must step in to 
penalize those agents with the aim of restoring social order and rebuilding public trust in 
government institutions. They must not stand by and expect other government agencies to 
sort out their internal problems and corruption. 
In Guiding Case 6, for example, four assistant city management (chengguan) agents, 
who were supposed to prevent unlicensed vendors from setting up stalls in the Huangpu 
District of Guangzhou, instead extorted bribes from several hundred vendors over a one-year 
period, allowing them to continue selling on the streets and causing a great deal of congestion, 
rubbish build up, and disturbance to local residents and shops. When law enforcement 
officers subsequently tried to clear the streets, they were attacked by angry vendors who 
thought they had paid for the right to sell their goods, resulting in serious riots and 
hospitalization of several officers. The Guiding Case declares: “The behaviour of these four 
defendants seriously impacted on the social and economic order in that district, and on urban 
and public safety management, causing a negative social influence.”62 The guiding case then 
notes that although these agents were not listed as government employees, they were staff 
carrying out public duties for a state institution, so the appropriate offence was Chapter 9, Art 
397 of the PRC Criminal Law, “abuse of power by state functionaries in the performance of 
their duties,” and the four defendants were all sentenced to jail terms ranging from 1 to 1.5 
years. 
                                                          
62 Guiding Case 6, ‘Basic Facts’. 
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The clear implication behind this case is that many kinds of social disorder or 
disturbance, such as riots by unlicensed street vendors, are not spontaneous occurrences, but 
result from long-simmering social tensions whose root cause is official corruption or 
dereliction of duty. Procurators must go beyond prosecuting the obvious culprits – in this 
case, violent street vendors – to punish those corrupt or negligent officials who allowed the 
disturbance to happen, as this is the only way to restore social harmony.63  
Likewise, in two of the food safety cases, procurators are reminded that they should not 
merely punish individuals and businesses that sell contaminated food to unsuspecting 
customers, but should actively investigate the role of food safety officials in allowing the 
offences to occur. In Guiding Case 15, the defendant businesses had been found processing 
diseased corpses of pigs into salted meat and salted sausages, and adding harmful substances 
to preserve them, then selling them as fresh meat in markets. Three local food safety 
inspectors had accepted bribes from the defendants to look the other way and to give them 
advance warning of upcoming surprise inspections. As a result, instead of being removed 
from the food chain immediately, unsafe meat was sold to consumers for over a year, which 
greatly exacerbated the adverse health consequences. The food safety inspectors were 
sentenced to jail terms ranging from 2.5 to 7.5 years. And in Guiding Case 16, food safety 
officers were found to have accepted bribes from businesses selling gutter cooking oil (oil 
that had already been used for cooking by restaurants and discarded), in order to reduce the 
offenders’ fines and allow them to continue selling the unsafe contaminated oil rebranded as 
new oil. After the food safety officers were finally prosecuted by diligent procurators, they 
received jail terms ranging from 2 to 6 years. 
                                                          
63 This point is reinforced in several other cases, such as Guiding Case 7, where two officers 
of a district Fair Trade Office in Tianjin failed to prosecute an illegal and fraudulent pyramid 
investment scheme. The Case concludes: “If [people’s procurators] find that administrative 
enforcement staff are abusing their positions to benefit themselves and failing to pass 
criminal cases over for prosecution, those staff should also be criminally prosecuted”. 
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In this way, the Guiding Cases constantly reinforce the point that when crimes occur, 
procurators must root out any related corrupt behaviour by responsible officials. Thus, the 
procurators’ role is not merely to prosecute cases but to monitor other administrative arms of 
the government, so that people do not lose faith in the justice system, and social harmony is 
maintained. 
Even the police should not be immune from prosecution, something that rarely seems to 
occur when criminal suspects are abused in police detention.64 Though not related to torture 
allegations, Guiding Case 8 focuses on the prosecution of a district police sergeant in 
Shenzhen, who had received bribes of 300,000 yuan in return for allowing an unlicensed 
nightclub to continue in business and turning a blind eye to its lack of safety permits and 
other criminal activity. After the nightclub burned down in a fire, killing 44 people and 
injuring 64 others, the police sergeant was convicted of dereliction of duty, perverting the law 
for private gain and accepting bribes, and sentenced to 13 years in prison.65 The implication 
is that procurators should not be afraid to go after police officers when their actions 
encourage law-breaking. 
By contrast, in some situations of social disorder, procurators may find that criminal 
prosecution of ordinary citizens is not appropriate at all, as it does not resolve the underlying 
social conflict. The very first Guiding Case issued in 2010 underscores the mediating role of 
procurators:66   
 
                                                          
64 Human Rights Watch (2015), sections entitled “Lack of Accountability” and “Impunity for 
Perpetrators.” 
65 Guiding Case 8, “Progress of the Case”. 
66 Guiding Case 1, “Key Points”. 
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When procurators take on cases where mass incidents have led to the commission of 
criminal offences, they must approach them from the perspective of resolving social 
contradictions. They should gain a deep understanding of the complex elements 
behind the case, and carefully deal with each element, actively participating in 
mediating conflicts with the aim of promoting social harmony, and bringing about a 
resolution that organically combines legal and social impacts.  
 
In Guiding Case 1, a longstanding dispute between two villages over drainage and 
sewage routes had boiled over into a riot where several residents and police were injured and 
two police cars were damaged. The police had arrested 17 suspects from both villages, and 
passed them over to the local procurator, having charged them with causing an affray. 
Realizing that this was a complex local dispute, the procurator set up a mediation group that 
visited both villages, listened to the arguments of residents on both sides, sought the 
assistance of the local government and Party committee to provide a proper drainage and 
sewage system that would not encroach on the disputed land of either village, and persuaded 
all the villagers to sign a mediation agreement acknowledging that the dispute had been 
resolved and promising not to reopen the conflict. The arrested suspects were also given 
education sessions on the importance of complying with the law, and they expressed their 
remorse at having used violence to deal with the dispute. The Guiding Case concludes:67  
 
The behaviour of the 17 defendants allegedly breached the PRC Criminal Law … 
and they are suspected of gathering a crowd to cause an affray, so according to the 
law they should be criminally prosecuted. Yet the 17 defendants’ purpose in causing 
                                                          
67 Guiding Case 1, “Progress of the Case”. 
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an affray was not for personal vengeance or unconscionable conduct, and the 
personal injuries and damage to property were minor, with no serious consequences; 
in addition, the two village committees have signed a mediation agreement, and the 
17 defendants have signed undertakings. Therefore, based on the principle of 
integrating punishment with education, and considering the benefits of promoting 
social harmony, … the Shishi City People’s Procurator … made the decision to drop 
the charges against the 17 defendants. 
 
In this way, the Guiding Cases make it clear that maintaining and promoting social 
harmony is a fundamental aim of criminal law. Where it would not promote harmony, and on 
the contrary would likely exacerbate local community tensions, the procurators should use 
their discretion to drop criminal charges, and instead find alternative ways to reduce those 
social tensions and resolve the underlying conflicts.  
By contrast, in the Guiding Cases involving state officers and agents discussed above, 
the aim of promoting social harmony requires procurators to go beyond pursuing the obvious 
perpetrators of harmful criminal conduct, and to prosecute any officials or state agents who 
have negligently or corruptly allowed that conduct to occur. This is the only way to prevent 
further recurrence of such harmful conduct and restore public faith in law enforcement 






ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: GUIDING CASES AS 
EDUCATIONAL TOOLS  
The SPP’s Guiding Cases may serve two different educative functions. Firstly, they guide 
procurators throughout China on how to approach certain difficult procedural issues and 
social conflicts, so they are an internal professional manual for procurators. Secondly, they 
remind procurators that part of their job is to educate ordinary citizens and government 
officials on how to comply with the law. These two educative functions are particularly 
evident in the eighth set of Guiding Cases (28-32), which all deal with environmental public 
interest lawsuits brought by people’s procurators. 
Interestingly, none of these five Guiding Cases are criminal prosecutions. They are civil 
lawsuits against polluters or administrative lawsuits against government bodies that have 
failed to prevent pollution. In other countries, such public interest lawsuits would generally 
be brought by civil society groups, such as the Sierra Club or Greenpeace.68 The reason for 
allowing such groups to sue is that frequently local power interests are either benefitting from 
the harm or have been “captured” through bribery by those committing the harm. This makes 
it less likely that individual complaints by victims will be addressed.69  
China’s catastrophic environmental situation is well known. A personal account by the 
writer Sheng Keyi in 2014 gave a vivid picture of the major health and ecological damage 
caused by pollution of one water system, the Lanxi River in South-Western Hunan Province. 
Sheng noted that in her youth, the Lanxi River used to be clean enough to bathe in. Fish, 
flowers and waterbirds were abundant, and on holidays the River was the focus of various 
activities such as dragon boat races. However, over the past two decades, the Lanxi River has 
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become “lined with factories, from mineral processing plants to cement and chemical 
manufacturers…. Factories discharge tons of untreated industrial waste into the water every 
day. Animal waste from hundreds of livestock and fish farms is also discarded in the river. It 
is too much for the Lanxi to bear. After years of constant degradation, the river has lost its 
spirit. It has become a lifeless toxic expanse that most people try to avoid. Its water is no 
longer suitable for fishing, irrigation or swimming. One villager who took a dip in it emerged 
with itchy red pimples all over his body.”70  
More seriously, Sheng’s home village now has cancer levels much higher than the 
national average, and is one of approximately 200 “cancer villages” where residents’ health 
has been seriously harmed by industrial pollution. The ground water and surrounding soil has 
also become contaminated so that crops grown in the area are no longer safe to eat. Sheng 
notes that “some 280 million Chinese people drink unsafe water, according to the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection. Nearly half of the country’s rivers and lakes carry water that is 
unfit even for human contact.”71 
As part of its efforts to address these problems, the Chinese government introduced 
amendments to the PRC Civil Procedure Law in 2013 and subsequent provisions in the 2015 
PRC Environmental Protection Law that permitted “qualified” civil society groups “active in 
environmental public interest activities” to bring public interest suits against polluters.72 
There was no shortage of qualified groups: a 2015 news report calculated that over 700 
Chinese-registered NGOs would meet the qualification requirements to bring such 
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environmental lawsuits.73 However, the numbers of public interest lawsuits brought by NGOs 
has remained extremely low, with only six cases filed during the whole of 2016.74  
A key obstacle is the failure of many courts to require the losing defendants to pay any 
of the legal costs of the plaintiffs, especially when their lawyers have represented them on 
contingency fee agreements, which makes bringing such lawsuits prohibitively expensive for 
most NGOs. Thus, while some major victories against individual polluters have occurred, 
they are far from sufficient to prevent continuing environmental degradation on a massive 
scale.75 
In a further attempt to resolve the twin problems of pollution and lack of litigation – 
while at the same time maintaining state supervision over the process – the NPC Standing 
Committee issued a Decision in July 2015 allowing people’s procurators in thirteen provinces 
and municipalities to experiment with bringing public interest lawsuits to “uphold the 
authority of the Constitution and laws, the principle of a fair and just society, and to defend 
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the public interests of the State and society.”76 While procurators should initially encourage 
qualified private plaintiffs or relevant government agencies to bring lawsuits or enforcement 
actions against the tortfeasors, if this failed to correct the harm, the procurators could act as 
plaintiffs themselves, bringing a civil or administrative action on behalf of the public 
interest.77 
The NPCSC Decision and the subsequent SPP Implementing Measures include several 
areas of law where public interest suits may be brought: “the protection of the ecological 
environment, protection of resources, state-owned asset protection, state-owned land use 
rights, and food safety.”78 However, the five Guiding Cases (28-32) that illustrate this new 
public interest lawsuit procedure all focus on environmental pollution and illegal land 
use/resource extraction issues.79 
Of the five Guiding Cases, four include administrative lawsuits against the government 
bodies that have failed to enforce the pollution laws. This proportion suggests that the main 
problem with protecting the environment and resources in China is a failure of enforcement 
by environmental, water protection and other government agencies. Statistics issued by the 
SPP in mid-2017 on the results from the 13 regions testing the new public interest procedure 
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confirm this conclusion: among the 9,053 public interest cases started by people’s procurators 
since mid-2015, some 5,162 cases were subsequently resolved by the relevant government 
enforcement agency before any formal court process began.80  
Guiding Case 32 is a representative example: seven stone materials processing 
companies in Jinping County, Guizhou continued to operate despite the local procurator 
warning the Jinping County environment bureau that the companies were breaching laws 
against discharging polluted waste into the Qingshui River. The seriousness of the pollution 
was quite similar to that described by Sheng Keyi in her account of the Lanxi River in 
neighbouring Hunan Province. Besides causing serious floating waste and effluent problems 
in the river, the extra sediment also increased the risk of flooding in reservoirs further 
downriver.  The Jinping environment bureau failed to respond to the procurator, and only 
after one year ordered the companies to pay relatively small fines, but did not stop them 
operating or require remediation of the polluted waste.  
In December 2015, the Jinping County procurator then applied to bring a “centralized 
jurisdiction” (集中管辖) administrative lawsuit in Fuquan City People’s Court against the 
Jinping environmental bureau. The Guiding Case explains that this centralized procedure 
takes the litigation away from the defendants’ local government region to a higher-level court. 
This helps to overcome the problem of local protectionism, where local governments and 
courts may prefer to protect the revenues that they receive and the employment provided by 
illegal businesses, rather than protecting the natural environment. It is especially important 
when the harm caused by the illegal behaviour crosses local government boundaries, such as 
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water pollution that benefits the producers but harms those who live downriver in other 
jurisdictions.81  
In Guiding Case 32, after the centralized lawsuit commenced, the Jinping County 
environment bureau promised to close down the polluting businesses, but an investigation by 
the local procurator found that they were still operating. Based on this evidence, the Fuquan 
City People’s Court held that the environment protection bureau had been negligent in 
carrying out its supervisory duties, and ordered it to act immediately to stop the illegal 
pollution and close down the infringing companies. 
A great deal of publicity surrounded this case, doubtless because it was one of the first 
to apply the new procedure allowing people’s procurators to initiate public interest 
administrative litigation. The Guiding Case notes that after the court’s judgment was 
published, the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government leaders 
ordered the Provincial Environment Protection Office (PEPO) to set up a working group to 
go to Qiandongnan Prefecture, within which Jinping County is situated, to stop the polluting 
companies from operating, and then report the results to environmental protection offices at 
every level throughout Guizhou Province. The PEPO also created a personal responsibility 
system to ensure that environmental offices throughout the Province would fulfil their 
enforcement duties and cooperate with procurators bringing other public interest lawsuits. 
Finally, they required the Jinping County government to create a comprehensive 
environmental plan to prevent future pollution from all local industrial operations. 
In terms of its educative function, the Guiding Case states that during the period of the 
court proceedings, “the directors of all municipal and county environmental protection offices 
in Qiandongnan Prefecture, the main managers of all government administrative departments 
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in Jinping County, and all directors of townships in the region where environmental 
degradation is serious attended court to listen to the trial, and in this way a single case being 
brought in the court served as a salutary warning to educate a whole region.”82 
This tendency to treat the Guiding Cases as educational opportunities is common to 
most of these environmental public interest cases. For example, Guiding Case 31, which 
deals with polluting electronic waste in Sanming City, Fujian, concludes by noting that the 
Fujian Provincial Government publicly praised the work of the local procurators in bringing 
this lawsuit, and ordered the Fujian Environmental Protection Office to circulate it 
throughout the Province as a warning. Several mainstream media outlets including Chinese 
Central TV also reported on the results of the case and gave it a positive evaluation.83 
Likewise, Guiding Case 30, on illegal deforestation and rock quarrying in Hubei Province, 
notes that the Party Committee of the local municipality, Shiyan City, strongly supported the 
procurator’s lawsuit, and arranged for over 70 leaders of relevant administrative agencies in 
the region to observe the court proceedings. The director of the Yunyang District Forestry 
Office bowed down and apologized to the court for his failure to prevent the illegal logging, 
and the Hubei Provincial Forestry Office ordered all forestry departments in the Province to 
learn from the procurator’s lawsuit, and conscientiously enforce the forestry laws to avoid 
being sued themselves.84     
Seen in this broader context, the Chinese government’s promotion of environmental 
public interest lawsuits by the people’s procurators is a positive development, as it brings 
both public scrutiny and higher-level government scrutiny on infringing behaviour that is 
often tacitly permitted by local governments. As noted above, the SPP’s figures on the two-
year experiment found that up to the end of June 2017, people’s procurators had opened 
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9,053 public interest cases and 5,162 of these cases were resolved prior to any formal court 
proceedings. The willingness of local government officials to avoid liability by resolving 
these cases may be because their performance and promotion prospects are now significantly 
based on their environmental protection record.85   
Among the cases that were not resolved before trial, 1,150 cases were brought to trial 
by the procurator plaintiff, and 35 cases were brought by private plaintiffs with the 
encouragement of the procurator. By mid-2017, 458 of these procurator lawsuits had been 
decided in favour of the plaintiffs. No cases had been decided in favour of the defendants. 
The other 692 lawsuits were apparently still ongoing at the time of the report.86 In terms of 
actually protecting the environment, another report concluded that people’s procurators in all 
the pilot regions supervised the remediation of 128,000 hectares of polluted agricultural, 
forestry, marsh and grasslands, and the clean-up of over 180 square kilometres of polluted 
waterways; they rectified the illegal behaviour of 1400 businesses, and recovered economic 
damages of 6.5 billion yuan.87  
What these figures suggest first is that it is still uncommon for NGOs to bring 
environmental public interest lawsuits: only 35 such suits were brought in the relevant 
regions during the two-year experimental period. By contrast, procurators brought 458 
successful court actions during the pilot period, which is already over ten times the number of 
private suits, and presumably a portion of the remaining 692 procurator lawsuits underway 
will ultimately be decided in favour of the plaintiffs too. Added to that are the 5,162 cases 
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settled before trial, which if supervised properly, will also lead to cessation of polluting 
activity. In other words, the system of procurator public interest lawsuits is certainly filling a 
serious gap in the legal enforcement of environmental pollution laws and supervision of 
relevant government agencies.  
Of course, to ensure that local government agencies do actually follow through on their 
commitments to clean up the pollution, the SPP would need to include in its implementing 
regulations a system of follow-up checks by procurators. And although the remediation 
figures noted above look impressive, they are still only a small fraction of the seriously 
polluted land, air and waterways in China. To give just one example, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection carried out a soil survey of samples taken across 6.3 million sq km 
of land, two-thirds of the country's total, and found that 16% of the samples (equivalent to 
over 1 million sq km of land) contain higher-than-permitted levels of pollution.88 This 
compares with the 128,000 hectares (just 1280 sq km) of polluted land cleaned up after the 
thousands of public interest cases won or settled by procurators during the two-year pilot 
program. 
In an attempt to increase the scale of enforcement, Cao Jianming, China’s Procurator-
General, proposed that the NPC Standing Committee expand the procurator public interest 
lawsuit procedure from 13 regions to all provinces and regions of China. This was approved 
in June 2017 through amendments to the PRC Civil Procedure Law and Administrative 
Procedure Law to clarify that all people’s procurators can now bring lawsuits in the public 
interest.89 Cao Jianming’s most recent report to the National People’s Congress stated that 
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another 10,925 new public interest cases have been opened by people’s procurators since the 
program was expanded. 
While this significant increase in the number of cases should assist with reducing 
environmental pollution, in a debate about the proposed amendments, the NPC Standing 
Committee’s members noted that more encouragement should be given to civil society 
groups and representative members of the public to bring public interest lawsuits, rather than 
relying primarily on the people’s procurators, who are presumably very busy with their 
criminal prosecution work.90 This would involve clarifying the costs provisions in the two 
relevant laws to ensure that the losing party in public interest lawsuits will cover the 
reasonable legal costs of the NGO plaintiffs. However, with the current Chinese leadership’s 
increased suspicion of civil society groups as a potential threat to the Party, such a reform 
may be difficult to push through.91 The expansion of procurator public interest lawsuits may 
be China’s best hope for the enforcement of environmental laws in the foreseeable future.92  
 
CRITIQUES OF THE SPP GUIDING CASES 
 
A comprehensive empirical study of the impact of the SPP’s Guiding Cases on 
procuracy behaviour and the administration of justice in China is beyond the scope of this 
article. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local procurators are familiar with the Guiding 
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Cases and generally follow them when they are faced with similar legal issues, but they do 
not view the Cases as binding precedents, as there is no penalty or automatic right of appeal if 
they fail to cite a relevant Guiding Case.93 Moreover, in many situations, no relevant Guiding 
Case will be available to assist procurators’ decision-making, and even where a Guiding Case 
exists, the relevant legal rule may not be explained properly.  
At a 2016 conference on case guidance, one people’s procurator from Yunnan Province 
noted the following problems with SPP Guiding Cases:94 1: The areas of procurator practice 
covered by the Guiding Cases are not complete, so they cannot fulfil all the needs of 
procurators in their work; 2:  It is not clear how some Guiding Cases are supposed to be 
typical, or what rules they establish in the application of the law; 3: The Guiding Cases do not 
provide sufficient explanations or legal reasoning, so their guiding significance is not 
adequate. 
Some of these problems have been addressed in the more recent SPP Guiding Cases. 
While the first four sets of cases focused primarily on summarizing the facts and the course 
of the prosecution, with only a couple of sentences on the “key points” of the Guiding Case, 
from the fifth set of cases onwards, all Guiding Cases have included the legal reasons used by 
the procurators to support their arguments; and from the seventh set of cases onwards, a 
relatively detailed section entitled “guiding significance” is added to each case explaining 
why the legal issues are important and how they should be applied more broadly in other 
cases. Finally, a noticeable addition to the tenth set of cases (issued in July 2018) is a brief 
summary of the defendant’s or defence lawyer’s arguments, including challenges to the 
legality of evidence, and the procurators’ legally supported response. These developments 
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should assist local procurators in understanding how to deal with similar procedural issues in 
their practice. 
The SPP has also bolstered the impact of some issues raised in the Guiding Cases by 
issuing further regulations (in collaboration with other legal institutions) that do have direct 
legal force, such as the 2017 Regulation on Exclusion of Illegal Evidence. At the same time, 
the SPP should revise its Regulation on Case Guidance to clarify that the cases are an 
officially endorsed interpretation of statutes such as the Criminal Procedure Law, so 
procurators should be required to follow Guiding Cases whenever relevant, unless they 
provide a clear public explanation to the court and defendants. Failure to interpret statutes 
consistently with the relevant Guiding Cases should provide grounds for appeal by 
defendants and should result in negative evaluation of procurators’ work performance. This 
would give the Guiding Cases more precedential weight.    
 
CONCLUSION: SPP GUIDING CASES AS EVIDENCE OF A CHANGING 
PROCURACY CULTURE 
Despite these valid criticisms, through these Guiding Cases the SPP does provide powerful 
support to local procurators who wish to protect the rights of wrongly charged defendants and 
challenge careless collection of evidence and brutality by the police. The Cases also provide 
clear guidance on the procedure to be used in public interest cases, and the possibility of 
moving cases to a “centralized jurisdiction” when local government offices fail to enforce the 
law. Finally, they make it clear that procurators must carry out their roles with careful 
attention to correct procedure, cautious supervision of the rule of law both within and outside 
the court system, and conscientious awareness of the importance of punishing the correct 
offenders with the appropriate penalties, and avoiding unjust conviction of innocent parties.  
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To outside observers schooled on liberal democratic rule of law principles, these may 
appear to be modest developments. Yet as noted in the first part of this article, the people’s 
procurators have previously worked closely with the Chinese police and local governments to 
punish crime harshly, but with little regard for defendants’ procedural rights, the exclusion of 
tainted evidence, or broader social justice issues such as environmental protection.  
The Guiding Cases therefore provide evidence of a cultural shift within the SPP towards 
a more professional procuracy that is willing to stand apart from local governments and law 
enforcement agencies when necessary to ensure that justice is done. One could view the 
Guiding Cases as a form of “soft law” that, even though not formally binding, should 
influence the interpretation of criminal procedure statutes by procurators who wish to 
advance their careers by actively contributing to the future direction of legal reform in 
China.95 There are indirect parallels with quasi-jurisprudential or “non-judicial precedent” 
practices in other countries, such as federal and state prosecutor offices and departments in 
the United States issuing opinions on legal questions or practices, which exert real though 
indeterminate influence over prosecutor behavior.96 Or perhaps the Guiding Cases are an 
attempt to create what Peerenboom calls a “cultural ethos” – a process of internalizing the 
“normative values of rule of law.”97 From a broader cognitive theoretical perspective, the 
Guiding Cases illustrate the SPP’s efforts to overcome negative institutionalized behaviours 
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that have been taken for granted, and to encourage procurators to move from “automatic 
cognition” to “deliberative cognition,” in other words, to think critically and reflexively about 
the rights of criminal suspects and the public interest.98 
Certainly, limits still remain on the kinds of cases where the procurators can stand up 
against injustice. In highly politicized cases, such as the recent prosecutions of rights defence 
lawyers and senior Party officials accused of corruption, the trials and convictions proceeded 
without any protests from procurators, despite clear evidence in many cases of wrongful 
detention and confessions obtained by torture.99 Similar neglect of basic criminal procedure 
rights has been evident in the recent widescale crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region.100 Like the Chinese courts themselves, the people’s procurators are still 
expected to defer to Communist Party authority and prosecute perceived “enemies” of the 
state, even though occasionally that authority clearly breaches legal protections for such 
defendants.101  
Yet where government agencies and offices, including local Party leaders, are 
criminally neglecting their duties or engaging in corrupt practices, the Guiding Cases make it 
clear that local people’s procurators should uphold the interests of ordinary people by 
bringing criminal prosecutions or public interest lawsuits against those malfeasants, or by 
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seeking a review of criminal convictions at a higher court level, in order to restore public 
faith in the government. 
Along with the growing professionalization of Chinese judges and lawyers, and the 
significant increase in transparency of trials and court judgments in recent years, this modest 
cultural shift within the procuracy should make it harder for corrupt and negligent officials 
and state agents like the police to abuse their positions and violate the basic rights of innocent 




APPENDIX: TABLE OF SPP GUIDING CASES 
Set and Date of 
Issuance 
Numbers of Cases Key Themes 
1:  
   15 December 2010 
 
3 cases: 1-3 
No single theme: Case 1: settling mass riots; 
Case 2: challenging suspended death penalty; 
Case 3: Prosecuting officials who take bribes 
2:  
   21 November 2012 
 
 
5 cases: 4-8 
Prosecuting officials and state agents for 
criminal dereliction of duty and corruption 
3:  
   27 May 2013 
 
 
3 cases: 9-11 
Prosecuting offence of spreading fake terror 
information 
4:  
   20 February 2014 
 
 
5 cases: 12-16 
Prosecuting food safety offences and 
associated official corruption 
5:  
   15 September 2014 
 
 
3 cases: 17-19 
Examples of prosecutors challenging court 
verdicts as too lenient or too strict 
6:  
   9 July 2015 
 
 
4 cases: 20-23 
Prosecuting offences beyond the limitation 
period 
7: 
   31 May 2016 
 
4 cases: 24-27 
One case on interpreting insider trading 
provisions; three cases on excluding tainted 




   4 January 2017 
 
5 cases: 28-32 
Environmental public interest civil and 
administrative lawsuits brought by people’s 
procurators 
9:  
   16 October 2017 
 
6 cases: 33-38 
Four cases on offence of disrupting computer 
information systems (hacking); two cases on 
online theft/fraud 
10:  
   12 July 2018 
 
3 cases: 39-41 
Prosecuting financial fraud, including stock 
pump and dump schemes, online pyramid-
loan schemes, and pyramid-selling offences 
11: 
  18 November 2018 
 
3 cases: 42-44 




  19 December 2018 
 
4 cases: 45-48 
 
Offences raising the issue of justified self-
defence 
13: 
  25 December 2018 
 
3 cases: 49-51 
Two public interest cases correcting 
negligence by government officials; one case 
on defamation of revolutionary martyrs 
14: 
  21 May 2019 
 
5 cases: 52-56 
Various criminal fraud cases involving fake 
official or company/bank documents 
 
15: 
  9 September 2019 
 
3 cases: 57-59 
Cases on procurator’s duty to monitor and 
seek review of administrative errors by 
government institutions or officials  
 
